Salafism in the UK. The Reasons for its Success

Last update: 2024-11-26 16:33:25

With its claim to constitute an authentic and uncontaminated religiosity, Salafism exerts a strong power of fascination over the younger generations of European Muslims, to whom it seems able to offer ethical certainty in a confused and rapidly changing world.  The example of the United Kingdom demonstrates how this interpretation of Islam has spread, from what forms of international support it has benefited and which currents it has brought into being.

 

Over the last decade, debates about Islam in Europe have been dominated by security concerns in light of the increased acts of terrorism committed by Muslims inspired by global networks such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. Specifically, politicised Islamists and ultraconservative Salafi forms of Islamic religiosity have been linked to these international movements and have become the target of political and media concerns. Salafism in particular has been accused of providing the religious ideology that rationalises terrorist violence. This article provides a brief overview of Salafi beliefs and practices and outlines the migration, settlement and growth of Salafism in Britain and its possible future trajectories.

 

 

A New Religious Paradigm

 

Despite a growing body of academic literature on the subject, Salafism appears to be confounding analysts and commentators who misunderstand its religious nuances and internal diversity.[1] This is further complicated by the fact that some Salafis advocate peaceful co-existence while others employ violence to achieve social change. In any case, it is important to acknowledge that Salafism as religious paradigm has evolved over time and it needs to be understood contextually in relation to its theological claims and historical development.

 

Salafism as a term refers to a religious stream within Sunni Muslims which is “based on the pure, undiluted teachings of the Qur’an, the Sunna (Prophetic Traditions) and practices of the early Muslim generations (the Salaf).”[2] The reverence for these early Muslims is based upon their chronological proximity to the Prophetic period as they were noted for their exemplary piety and involvement in the early territorial expansion of Muslim power. This led some prominent theologians to suggest a causal relationship between the faith of the “pious forefathers” and their subsequent success in building the first Islamic empires.

 

A defining feature of Salafism is the insistence on correct, “pure” belief and action. The desire for religious hygiene is articulated in discourses about purity of belief, body and social interactions. This is manifested in a continuous state of boundary maintenance between Muslims and non-Muslims and “pure and impure Muslims.” The idea of theological purity—encapsulated in the slogan of “returning to the Qur’an and Sunna”— is one of the most well known of catchphrases in the linguistic repertoire of Salafis and indirectly hints at the impurity/deficiency of non-Salafi Muslims. This simple, seductive phrase, underlines the importance of referring directly back the two textual sources of authority in Islam—the Qur’an and Hadīth. This bears a resemblance with some forms of Protestant literalism which insist upon the clarity of scripture accessible to lay readers.

 

Salafism relies upon a literalist scripturalism, alternating between a set of binary opposites: tawhīd (oneness of God) as opposed to shirk (polytheism), loyalty to the Prophetic Sunna (personal behaviour) in matters of religious ritual as opposed to bid‘a (religious innovation) and rejection of most of Muslim intellectual history, let alone the by-products of modernity such as rationality, the humanities or liberalism, which are also considered bid‘a potentially contaminating Islam. In their particular theological schema, these concepts take on a critical importance, as tawhīd connotes the doctrine that God alone has the right to be worshipped and that Muslims must protect themselves from shirk. As a result, Salafis are often accused by other Muslims of being arrogant, thinking of themselves as the only ones in possession of the true interpretation of Islam and implying that non-Salafi Muslims are committing minor forms of shirk. As a result, there is little tolerance for religious pluralism as only Salafis are the only true practitioners of the way of the Salaf and hence their self-designation as “Salafi.”

 

 

Global Variants and Local Manifestations

 

Salafism is a highly heterogeneous phenomenon that contains various trends and orientations that extend from quietists, politically activists to violent jihadists. This spectrum arises out of different approaches to fiqh (jurisprudence), manhaj (methods of religious reform) and politics even though they are fairly unified in matters of ‘aqīda (creed). These differences were vividly demonstrated in the aftermath of the failed Arab Uprisings of 2011 when Salafis participated in electoral processes in Egypt and gained nearly twenty five percent of the popular vote, even though they previously had declared that participating in democratic politics was harām (religiously unlawful). This entrance into secular domains signals some of the adaptations that have taken place among politically oriented Salafis, who see it as a way of strengthening their position among competing religious trends such as the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and as a way of gaining power to shape more Islamically virtuous societies. Similarly Salafism in Saudi Arabia has manifested differently from its Egyptian or Yemeni counterparts as a result of scholarly loyalties and differing socio-political contexts.

 

The literature produced by Salafi groups illustrates divergent anxieties that range from the mundane to sensitive political questions such as if they should refrain from buying Israeli goods and products and if it is acceptable for a good Muslim to fight to overthrow a Muslim government which fails to implement the sharia completely.[3]

 

The academic Samir Amghar observed that Salafism in Europe could be divided into three streams. The first is what he called “predicative Salafism,” which privileges preaching and religious teachings. The second, a “political Salafism,” that foregrounds social and political activism, and the third “revolutionary Salafism,” which centres jihad at the heart of religious beliefs. All three of these currents maintains a specific relationship with their respective countries with the latter being a very small minority.[4] While all of these Salafi trends display very socially conservative and theologically intolerant features—the majority are politically passive and non-violent and it would be a mistake to assume that they pose a security threat. To take one example, Dutch Salafis are predominantly quietist and have publically distanced themselves from coercion and violence.[5] The violent manifestation that is a threat has been labelled “Salafi Jihadism” or “Takfirism,” which is modern fusion of ultra-conservative theology with political ideology. As Anthropologist and researcher on terrorism Scott Attran observes:

 

Takfiris (from takfīr, excommunication) are rejectionists who disdain other forms of Islam, including Wahhabism (an evangelical creed which preaches Calvinist-like obedience to the state) and most fundamentalist, or Salafi, creeds (which oppose fighting between co-religionists as sowing discord, or fitna, in the Muslim community). Salafi Islam is the host on which this viral Takfiri movement rides, much as Christian fundamentalism is the host upon which White Supremacism rides. The host itself is not the cause of the virus and is, indeed, a primary victim.[6]

 

This extremist tend operates at the margins of Muslim communities in Europe and is internally challenged by fellow Salafis who believe that they have damaged their reputation and cause.

 

British Salafism was largely popularised through the activism of one organisation but later became diversified into various splinter groups and tendencies. Unlike Islamists, Salafis do not organise themselves into hierarchical organisations, but function through networks of scholars, students and followers. Salafi approaches to Islam were introduced into the UK in the early 1980s through the Saudi state and private donor who funded the building and activities of mosques. There are relatively small but growing number of mosques which are  Salafi-oriented, among the most well known are the Salafi Institute in Birmingham, Brixton Mosque and Masjid Tawhid in London, The Islamic Centre in Luton and Masjid Sunnah in Manchester. While they make up a small number of the approximately 2000 or so mosques in Britain, their influence is increasing disproportionally due to their effective distribution of literature, activism and a strong media and internet presence. The organisation that became instrumental in spreading Salafism in the early 1990s was JIMAS (Jam‘iyya Ihyā’ Minhāj al-Sunna—the Society to Revive the Way of the Messenger), which was founded in 1984 by its-time leader Manwar Ali, also known as “Abu Muntasir.” He is credited for helping to spread Salafism among Muslim young people through his countless speeches at study circles, mosques, community centres and universities across the country. Towards the mid-1990s, Salafism as religious paradigm became well established nationally through a network of mosques, publications, media and a large body of literature which later became available on the internet.

 

Most British Salafis defer to and constantly reference the senior scholars of Saudi Arabia such as the late ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ibn Bāz (1910–99), Muhammad ibn al ‘Uthaymīn (1925–2001), Muhammad Nasr al-Dīn al-Albānī (1914–99) and current Scholars such as Sālih al-Fawzān (b. 1933) to bolster their claims of authenticity. As the historian Bernard Haykel points out:

 

[The] attraction to Salafism lies in the form of authority that it promotes, and reproduces, as well as the particular hermeneutics it advocates. It is not Salafism’s so-called “de-territorialised” and “fundamentalist” qualities, nor the “globalised” condition of modern life, that make Salafism particularly attractive. Rather it is Salafism’s claims to religious certainty that explain a good deal of its appeal, and its seemingly limitless ability to cite scripture to back these up.[7]

 

People found in Salafi perspectives an approach to religious commitment that seemed to be intellectually rigorous, evidence based and free of the corruption of folkloric religion or the alternatives offered by rival religious reform movements such as the Young Muslims UK and the radical Islamist Hizb al-Tahrīr. The JIMAS organisation mainly attracted young second-generation male and female South Asian Muslims, in addition to converts, particularly Afro-Caribbean, former Christians. Research with female newcomers suggests that converts found the coherent theology, clear-cut morality and sense of sisterhood in Salafi circles an attractive feature when compared to their experiences of Christianity. Other women were drawn to JIMAS having moved on from other Islamic groups that they fell short of their expectations and did not convincingly answer the key question of “What is true Islam?”[8]

 

 

Fragmentation and Evolution

 

The growth of British Salafism reached a critical juncture in 1995 when tensions that had been simmering between factions inside JIMAS eventually caused the organisation to rupture, leaving an ideological and methodological split that remains to this day. Ever since the first Gulf War in 1990–1991, Salafi scholars were divided over the presence of US troops in a land which is considered to be the spiritual heart of Islam. The origins of this fracture started within Saudi Arabia, when some younger scholars began questioning why the rulers had invited the Americans to fight another Muslim country and, worse still, establish military bases on sacred territory. These dissenting scholars, led by Salmān al-‘Awda and Safar al-Hawālī, or so-called Sahwa (Awakening) sheikhs, were intellectually influenced by the reformist ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and gained prominence in the 1990s through their critiques of the Saudi government.

 

Abu Muntasir had made links with the scholars in Saudi Arabia, but was opposed by the influential Abdul Wahid (also known as Abu Khadeejah), who took issue with the politicised orientation of the Sahwa movement. He challenged Abu Muntasir and this led to the fragmentation of JIMAS in 1995–6. Despite attempts by senior figures within the Salafi community to mend the rift, it became irreconcilable and Abu Khadeejah and others broke away to create the politically quietest Salafi Publications and earned the moniker of being “Super Salafis” given by other Salafis for their aggressive attempts to define who was or was not Salafi.

 

During this tense period the majority of Salafis did not only have to defend themselves against the inquisitional practises of the Super Salafis, but also had to cope with the emergence of a Salafi jihadist trend, represented by people like Jamaican convert Abdullah el-Faisal. Jihadist discourses migrated to the UK with the arrival of the exiled ideologues and nomadic former mujāhidīn in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Unemployed and seeking a purpose, many of these holy warriors travelled to and from various conflict hotspots looking for Muslim causes in which they could fight.

 

Abdullah el-Faisal took advantage of this social context and attempted to build a support base in Britain. He caused anxiety among both JIMAS and the Super Salafis because of his perceived superior religious knowledge. El-Faisal was a graduate of Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa‘ūd University, Saudi Arabia and served for a short time as the Imam at Brixton mosque in the early 1990s, before he was removed. He became known for his fiery speeches with themes that condemned the Saudi religious establishment. He produced well known lectures such as The Devil’s Deception of the Saudi Salafis, declaring the UK as dār al-harb (land of war) and encouraging people to steal from rich Gulf Arab tourists. His rhetoric presented a major problem to British Salafis of all persuasions, causing some to orientate towards Jihadism.

 

The repercussions of 9/11 and 7^th of July London terrorist attacks were also major factors in the mutation of British Salafism, as media attention began to focus on the possible link between Salafism and terrorism. The aftermath of the London bombings forced other strands of Salafism to become more introspective. The increased media and political scrutiny, as well as the force of new anti-terrorist legislation brought home the potential danger of extremist exclusivist Salafi discourses and provided an impetus for intra-Muslim cooperation and consensus building. JIMAS joined other Islamic groups to organise lectures to explain the difference between jihad and terrorism. It is also worth noting that Salafi Publications was also vocally condemning al-Qaeda even before the London attacks.

 

 

Between Integration and Isolation

 

Salafism in the early days of JIMAS was a radical new perspective for many young Muslims. Like other significant religious trends such as Hizb al-Tahrīr, Salafism offered a rejection of encultured Islam. Towards the end of the 2000s some observers noticed the emergence of what has been called “Salafism Lite,” as some Salafis attempted a strategic de-emphasis of Salafi motifs in their language and literature and instead used phrases like “orthodox Islam” or “normative Islam,” to encode their Salafi loyalties. This implicit Salafism transcends individual organisations and has been boosted by the popularity of satellite TV stations such as the Islam Channel and Peace TV. This development, along with the continued ubiquitous presence of pro-Salafi literature, has helped to promote the Salafisation of popular religious discourses.

 

The appeal of Salafism for young British Muslims can be attributed to a set of interrelated factors which were transnational in character, well funded and timely. First among them was the globalisation of Saudi Salafi discourse through the public and private financing of certain British Muslim institutions, the distribution of Salafi literature, saturation of Salafi perspectives on the internet and free scholarships to study in the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia. Second, there was a fertile reception of Salafi-oriented themes among British-born Muslims who were in search of religious identities that would restore their religious pride. Thirdly, for those inclined to Salafism it appeared to offer an apparently evidence-based uncompromising, uncontaminated Islam which provided ethical certainty in a confusing, rapidly changing world, privileging their claims to authenticity as the only Muslims adhering to the concept of tawhīd, “the authentic Sunna” and “manhaj of the Salaf.” Salafism aggressively rejected theo-cultural diversity within South Asian forms of Islam, branded them as impure and led to an ultra-orthodox elitism over “lesser Muslims” and separation from a disbelieving British society.

 

Salafi perspectives in Britain today can be said to have six sub-tendencies: puritan, apolitical Super Salafis, Politicised Salafis, Jihadi Salafis, the Liberal Progressive Salafis of JIMAS and the Methodological Salafism of the iERA/AlMaghrib nexus, whose religious praxis is not aligned with any particular group but is more of an approach to Islamic textual sources and scholarly reference points. The quietest, Super Salafis who are still the most influential of them through their web presence and publications and have recently experienced a split which is apparently due to a parting of ways between sheikh Muhammed bin Hādī al-Madkhalī, one of their religious reference points, and sheikh Rabī‘ al-Madkhalī. Today, British Salafis have had to slowly adapt to the changing social and political climate within the UK because of religious rivalries with other revivalist trends as well as intra-Salafi disputation. The end result is that they have become both integrated and isolated and will likely to continue doing so in the future.

 

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Oasis International Foundation

 

 

[1] Roel Meijer. (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement. London: Hurst & Co., 2009; Henri Lauzière, The Making of Salafism: Islamic reform in the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016 and Frank Griffel, “What Do We Mean By Salafi? Connecting Muhammad ‘Abduh with Egypt’s Nur Party in Islam’s Contemporary Intellectual History,” Die Welt des Islams, vol. 55 (2015), pp. 186–220.

[2] Mohamed Bin Ali, “Salafis, Salafism and Modern Salafism: What Lies Behind a Term?,” RSIS Commentary, no. 57 (18 March 2015).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Samir Amghar, “Salafism and Radicalisation of Young European Muslims,” in Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur, Michael Emerson (eds), European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007, pp. 38–51.

[5] Margaretha A. van Es, “Muslims Denouncing Violent Extremism Competing Essentialisms of Islam in Dutch Public Debate,” Journal of Muslims in Europe, vol. 7, no. 2 (2018), pp. 146–166.

[6] Scott Attran, “Who becomes a terrorist,” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 2, no. 5 (2008), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/35/html.

[7] Bernard Haykel, On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action, in Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism, p. 36.

[8] Annabel Inge, The Making of a Salafi Muslim Woman: Paths to Conversion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.